


CA1
ND 51
- 1991
P58

National
Defence

Défense
nationale


Government
Publications



IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: EUROPE, NATO AND THE ESDI DEBATE

by

MICHEL FORTMANN



EXTRA-MURAL PAPER NO.58

ORAE

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

OTTAWA

Canada

NOVEMBER 1991

GOVERNMENT
PUBLIC

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

EXTRA MURAL PAPER NO. 58


In Search of an Identity:
Europe, NATO and the ESDI Debate
by

Michel Fortmann
University of Montreal
Department of political science

An Extra-Mural Paper presents the view of its author on a topic of potential interest to DND. Publication by ORAE confirms the interest but does not necessarily imply endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its conclusions. It is issued for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
I. Fits and starts: the slow emergence of Europe's Security and Defence Identity	7
1. A myth in search of its roots: ESDI's early phases	7
2. Sometimes a great notion? The ESDI issue during the eighties	10
II. In search of substance: the competing models of a European Security and Defence Identity	16
1. Two blueprints for the same idea: ESDI between NATO and the European Community ...	16
2. ESDI as seen from a Euro-centrist perspective	18
3. ESDI as seen from an Atlanticist perspective	22
III. Where do they stand? The allies and the ESDI issue	27
1. France: always the odd man out	27
2. France's wobbly supporters: Italy, Spain, Belgium and Germany	29
3. Britain and the Atlanticists	31
4. The United States: signals or noises?	32
Conclusion	34
Notes	38
Annex: Chronology of the European Defence Identity ...	40



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761116370818>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This paper examines the current debate on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). It begins by presenting a brief critical analysis of earlier European attempts to establish a distinct identity on defence and security issues, which will set the historical context for the current debate. The second chapter lends greater definition to the concept of ESDI by reviewing the different models put forth by various participants in the debate. This is followed by a discussion on the current debate, and an account of the positions held by major NATO Alliance partners. The paper also assesses the implications of this debate for the NATO Alliance and for Canadian security policy.

2. The paper's principal findings are as follows:

- a. Although the current debate on ESDI echoes Europe's strong drive towards closer political unity, ESDI itself remains a concept that lacks a precise functional or institutional definition.
- b. At the moment, there are two competing models of a potential European Security and Defence Identity. What could be called the "Eurocentric Model" would have, in the long term, EC institutions (such the European council or the EC's Commission) in charge of common European policies on defence and security issues. The competing "Atlanticist Model" would keep the NATO Alliance at the hub of Europe's security policy-making machinery for the foreseeable

future, although it envisions a more significant European role within the Alliance.

- c. Over the past two years, NATO appears to have succeeded in adapting its organisation and policy to the new European security environment much more quickly and efficiently than had been expected. By contrast, advocates of the Eurocentric Model have not reached agreement on what would constitute a viable alternative to the Alliance. To a large extent, the Eurocentric Model has become entangled in the broader and infinitely more complex debate over Europe's political future, something which is far from being resolved.
- d. In the early going, the Eurocentric model appeared to have the support of many allies including Germany and France. As things currently stand, a clear majority has emerged which favours a more vigorous European identity on defence and security issues finding its expression within an Alliance framework. Alone among the allies once again, France remains the only major proponent of the eurocentric Model.

INTRODUCTION

1. For many observers, the profound changes which have transformed Europe's political geography since 1989 should be hailed as the harbingers of a new era of peace and cooperation on the continent. But the positive developments brought about by the end of the cold war tend to overshadow the fact that any drastic political mutation of the kind we are witnessing today is generally followed by a lengthy and difficult process of adaptation. In other words, political change should not be expected to be an orderly and rational process. It is by nature a messy phenomenon which the Duke of Cambridge described many years ago as "something only to be contemplated when it can no longer be avoided".

2. Among the many complex issues raised by the end of the cold war in Europe, the most confusing and frustrating by far is the need to an institutional security system more in tune with the continent's evolving strategic environment.

3. Barely two years ago, things looked rather simple. Not only was the Atlantic Alliance the keystone of Western Europe's security and defence posture, but it was also the engine propelling the East-West dialogue. Most of all, however, NATO was a working decision-making body representing the majority of Western European states combined under the leadership of the United States.

4. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the successful reunification of Germany and the sweeping democratization of Eastern Europe, the Atlantic Alliance is apparently falling victim to its own success.

5. In essence, the unity of purpose brought about by a clear and present danger from the East and the necessary leadership of Washington has fallen by the wayside. Instead, Europeans are being pulled in different directions by nations whose interests often run at cross-purpose. In other words, the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the demise of the bipolar system have lifted the lid off a Pandora's box of intra-European power politics. Moreover, because it offers no clear view of the threats and risks that lie ahead, the present situation suggests no ready-made blueprint of what ought to be done. This relatively tense and uncertain situation is clearly reflected in the recent debate between the advocates of a revitalized Alliance on the one side and the spokesmen for a new European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) on the other.

6. In a nutshell, most European governments see the end of the cold war as the beginning of a new phase in the process of European political and economic integration. The timetable advocated by those who wish to move the European Community towards something like a federal union involves three phases. Phase one will end with the signing in Maastricht, in December 1991, of the new treaties on economic, monetary and political union. Phase two, to begin in 1993, will see the start of negotiations with new candidates for membership of the Community. Phase three, expected to open well before 1997, will consist in a review of what European defence and security really means.

7. The chances are promising, then, that by the middle of the decade eighteen countries will sign a new European Community treaty taking them further along the

path towards an integrated union. This push for economic and political integration is no passing fad, and Western Europe's new assertiveness in the area of foreign and security policy should be viewed against this background. Specifically, in order to evolve from solely an economic market to a real multifaceted Community, many feel that Europe has to develop a distinct identity in international relations and take charge of its own defence. Only then - it is felt - will Europe be perceived as a viable international actor equal in influence to a superpower.

8. However, the dream of a federal Europe is not shared by all, and one could argue that there are as many visions of Europe as there are members in the EC. In addition, some countries are using the Eurocentric label to advance their own particular ambitions which further confuses the issue.

9. On the other side of the debate, the Atlanticists do not constitute a more harmonious group than their Eurocentric counterparts. They include not only the North-American members of NATO - whose transatlantic bias is understandable - but many European governments which advocate both a stronger economic Community and a revitalized NATO. Their argument runs as follows. Europe's future security is still highly uncertain for obvious reasons; chief among these is, of course, political instability in the East, including the Soviet Union. As a result, preserving the transatlantic link is therefore the only way to ensure credible security, at least in the short term.

10. Moreover, some European members of NATO do not believe that political union is viable at this time. Many see the EC institutions as suffering from a "democratic deficit" and fear that a future European foreign and security policy might be decided without appropriate intergovernmental consultations. They feel, in fact, that their interests would be better served in the Alliance than in the EC Councils. For one country at least - Britain - the transferring of foreign and security policy responsibilities to the European Community and even speculation about potential federal union are an anathema. Last, but certainly not least, the Americans are playing for high stakes in the NATO/ESDI debate. Indeed, they tend to perceive the current situation as a zero-sum game. In other words, any gain made by the Europeans in the area of foreign and security policy is seen as a potential loss of American influence in European affairs. Of course, all the Atlanticists, and even many Eurocentricists, agree that the Alliance is, for the time being, the only common defence organization adequately equipped to guarantee Europe's military security.

11. On the one hand, the debate just summarized does not differ markedly in substance or intensity from the numerous disputes that the Alliance has weathered in the past, and many commentators seem to think that the current differences between Atlanticists and Euro-centrists can be successfully papered over. This, incidentally, is precisely what the latest NATO communiqués have sought to achieve.

12. On the other hand, it would be foolish to assume that the present crisis can be managed in the same way as

past disputes and that unity will necessarily prevail in the end. Indeed, the uniqueness of NATO has historically resided in the fact that it was the only effective instrument capable of countering the military weight of the Soviet Union. But currently this task has lost its relevance. European security is becoming less and less a military issue while becoming a much broader regional and foreign policy issue, over which NATO cannot claim title. Of course, as long as there is a residual Soviet threat, the position of those who want to maintain the Atlantic link will remain strong, but there can be no denying that the Europeanization of Europe's security and defence policy will advance inexorably. In that sense, the issue of the European Security and Defence Identity echoes Europe's claim to once again be master of its own destiny.

13. The problem, of course, is that this Euromania clashes openly with Washington's sensitivities at a time when more and more Americans advocate a major US retreat from foreign entanglements¹.

14. Thus, even if the ESDI issue appears to many NATO observers as just another confusing buzzword, the political undercurrents which it signals should not be underestimated. Consequently, the implications of this debate should be thoroughly scrutinized especially by North American policy-makers who might otherwise dismiss as inconsequential the Eurocentric stance. In this perspective, the present paper will seek to clarify the ESDI issue and provide the reader with the factual background necessary to develop an informed point of view.

15. The first section will present a brief critical analysis of earlier European attempts to assert a distinct defence identity. It will also describe the emergence of the current situation.

16. The second section will define more precisely the concept of ESDI. It will also offer an analysis of the different models designed by the various participants in the debate.

17. The third section will offer a snapshot of the current state of play, taking into account the position of the Alliance's major actors. The possible outcomes of the current discussion and their implications for the Alliance will also be examined.

18. In the concluding section, particular attention will be paid to the implication of the ESDI-NATO debate for Canadian foreign policy. It is followed by an annex which provides a chronology of key ESDI related events.

I. FITS AND STARTS: THE SLOW EMERGENCE OF EUROPE'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY

1). A myth in search of its roots: ESDI's early phases

19. Usually, analysts present Europe's quest for an independent defence identity as a linear story beginning in 1948 as a timid idea progressively evolving into a coherent blueprint of Europe's future security architecture.

20. Accordingly, the Brussels Treaty, the European Defence Community (EDC), the Western European Union (WEU), the Fouchet and Harmel plans², the Elysée Treaty, etc..., are all pictured as milestones on the road to a final destination. This view, however, is incorrect and as misleading as the perception of NATO as the direct competitor of some kind of European defence identity. As a matter of fact with the exception of a handful of scattered episodes, the notion of a European defence identity outside of the Alliance was simply non-existent.

21. Specifically, several points should be made in that regard.

22. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the foundation of the Western European Union in 1954 should not be taken as the result of a dedicated effort to create some new kind of European defence framework distinct from NATO. The Brussels Treaty, for example, was intended, in the main, as a measure to signal to the United States that the Europeans were ready to do their share, alongside the Americans, to insure the defence of Western Europe. Similarly, the chief purpose of the WEU, created in the wake of the London

conference in 1955, was to facilitate the entry of Italy and Germany into the Alliance by providing a mechanism to monitor their rearmament. It is significant that, having served this purpose, the WEU fell rapidly into disuse.

23. The first real endeavour to organize a purely European defence falls to the Pleven plan, the objective of which was to create a European Defence Community along the lines of the yet to emerge European Economic Community. This project, although visionary, was doomed to fail because of its supranational nature. Europeans were not yet ready to transfer this aspect of their sovereignty to a regional organization. One may even argue that today's European governments are still not prepared to go this far; and in that perspective, the EDC is probably neither the only nor the best baseline in the current ESDI debate. Briefly put, the significance of the ESDI's predecessors should not be over emphasized.

24. In addition, one would be hard put to find coming out of the 50's and 60's any expression of a collective political will to create an alternative to the Alliance. Indeed, de Gaulle seems to have been, at the time, the only European head of state harbouring such a design. Specifically, the Fouchet plan in 1961 called for a European intergovernmental Council which would have been in charge of Europe's common defence and security policy. Also, in 1963, the Franco-German Treaty of cooperation attempted, without success, to launch a bilateral dialogue between Bonn and Paris in the area of defence. Both projects were stillborn.

25. Finally, a close examination of official statements and speeches during the period would not offer a clear definition of what was meant at the time by "Europe's Defence Identity". Indeed, the concept itself did not seem to exist in any form. Ironically, in a speech delivered in 1962 in Philadelphia, it was President Kennedy who coined the expression "European pillar" calling upon Western Europe to share more equitably the "burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations"³. Obviously, he meant that burdensharing was a condition for powersharing although it will remain conjecture whether Washington would have been ready to go so far as to strike that kind of bargain. But the salient point in this is that the notion of European Defence - as opposed to the concept of the Defence of Europe - had no political currency, no substance and no stated purpose.

26. A quick examination of the relevant events during the subsequent decade does not reveal much more to the historian or the analyst. Nevertheless, one fact does stand out. In 1970 we saw the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). This body, originally set up a forum for EC heads of state and Foreign ministers, was intended as a convenient platform for consultation on matters of foreign policy. Over the years it developed into a formalized body for consultation and cooperation. The EPC, in fact, permitted the ten and later the twelve member states to achieve some measure of consensus on a wide range of issues including: matters of security and cooperation in Europe, the peace process in the Middle East, etc...

27. In light of this modest success, beginning in 1973, numerous resolutions of the European Parliament and several Community reports called for the extension of this concept to include defence and security policy. In the language of one of those documents: "In practice, cooperation in the field of foreign policy can hardly ever be separated from defence and security policy"⁴.

28. Although this kind of statement did not progress beyond pious sentiment during the seventies, one could argue that it was at this point that the ESDI or Eurocentric model had found a measure of collective support among members of the EC. In general, though, to quote Henri Pac, a French political scientist:

Et comme notre époque est assez portée à considérer davantage les voix qui réclament que ce qui est réclamé, on en arrive, à la limite, à promettre la réalisation d'un vœu dont le contenu doit à son imprécision la plus grande part de sa force persuasive⁵.

Or stated differently, Europe's Defence Identity had acquired a measure of political visibility without having gained corresponding substance.

2). Sometimes a great notion? The ESDI issue during the eighties

29. The weakness of the notion of ESDI up to 1980 explains to a certain extent its lack of credibility even today, and, from an Alliance perspective, one could almost say that efforts to develop a European pillar in the framework of NATO were much more fruitful than the timid attempts which were initiated outside of the Alliance⁶. Nevertheless, the notion of a common European foreign

policy had taken roots and would grow in the coming decade. The major cause of this renewed interest can be found in the developing international situation of that era, namely the rise of a new more assertive American foreign policy and the parallel worsening of US-Soviet relations. For a majority of European governments still attached to the climate of East-West Detente, Reaganism was neither understood nor well received, and a return to what was labelled as the "new cold war" was bad news indeed in view of public opinion's reactions to it all across Europe⁷. In that context, it is not surprising that many European countries tried to distance themselves from what they perceived as a dangerous path. Furthermore, US unilateralism on many occasions angered even the staunchest Atlanticists⁸. As a result, starting in 1982, three new initiatives to assert Europe's distinctiveness in security and defence policy were attempted.

30. First, the new French socialist government tried progressively to revitalize the long suspended Elysée Treaty. In that regard, French intentions were clear. Indeed, for President Mitterrand, "the only embryo of common European Defence resided in the Franco-German Elysée Treaty"⁹. In other words, the French President was pursuing the old Gaullist dream of a European Defence and Security Community led in tandem by France and Germany. As for the German government, which came to power in 1984, the French initiative did have some attraction if only to balance "Euro centrism" with Atlanticism. Eventually, the Franco-German dialogue produced, in 1987, three notable results:

- a. the agreement to create a Franco-German brigade;
- b. the organization of an intergovernmental defence and security Council;
- c. the holding of bilateral field exercise called "Bold Sparrow" in the fall.

31. Over the same period, France tried also to formalize its bilateral defence relations with Spain and Italy along similar lines but with less visible results¹⁰.

32. Second, following again a French initiative, the Western European Union (WEU) was reactivated in 1984, not as a decision-making body but as a forum where seven and later nine¹¹ European countries could discuss defence and security problems among themselves. The WEU was reorganized as a "light" structure comprising:

- a. a Council which meets regularly at ministerial and ambassadorial level;
- b. a staff and several working groups which assist the Council;
- c. a parliamentary assembly which gathers four times a year.

33. In the coming years, the WEU mainly produced numerous reports and communiqués including the noted Platform on European Security Interests issued at The Hague in October 1987. The interest of this latter text resides mainly in the fact that it toes carefully the Atlanticist line. In other words, even if the reactivation of the WEU was intended as a show of European independence, the Union refrained from taking an aggressive stance or even too high a profile on the regional scene. However, it should be

noted that during this period, the WEU also attempted to coordinate its members' naval activities in response to events in the Gulf region from 1987 to 1988. In the words of an observer: "The success of the Gulf exercise has demonstrated that the WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation and practical co-operation between member countries in crisis situations where their security interests are affected"¹². As Ian Gambles suggests elsewhere, political concertation, however, does not mean operational command and the WEU should not be mistaken as a potential European military command¹³.

34. The third platform where Europeans continued to express eurocentric views in matters of defence and security was in the European community itself. This occurred at three levels.

35. To start with, the European Parliament, already active in this area during the seventies, created a subcommittee on security and disarmament. Also in the second half of the 80s, the European Parliament attracted attention with an impressive number of reports, resolutions and questions of its own regarding security and defence issues.

36. Moreover, with the signature and ratification of the Single European Act in 1987, the EC was linked formally to the EPC; additionally, the Community saw itself with a legitimate role in the area of defence and industrial cooperation. This, of course, would soon reopen the whole issue of the EC's right to regulate the European military industrial sector which until then had been outside the

scope of the Rome Treaty. Indeed, by 1989 a growing amount of dual-purpose military procurement by European defence ministries was already taking advantage of EC procurement procedures which provide equal opportunity, transparency and a whole set of instruments to enforce application and implement penalties. This, in turn, would quickly undermine the ability of certain NATO bodies like the IEPG to shelter themselves from the overall industrial development in the EC. Furthermore, the EC Commission - in the SEA framework - actively promoted R & D programs designed to strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry through such defence-related projects as ESPRIT (information technology), EURAM (advanced materials), RACE and BRITE (basic research in advanced communications and industrial technology) and EUREKA (space technology)¹⁴.

37. Finally, at the political level, the European community appointed the flamboyant Jacques Delors as president of the E.C. Commission. He was a staunch advocate of a European Defence Community which he perceived as one of the crowning elements of Europe's political Union¹⁵.

38. By the end of the decade, the notion of a European Defence Identity was taking shape, not as an isolated concept but as a necessary complement to Europe's coming political and economic union and more countries were progressively attracted to it. In addition, the first breakthroughs in the area of arms control signalled the beginning of a new era for East-West relations. Europe's security environment was about to change drastically and Europeans in general felt emboldened to express their

beliefs in the emergence of a new more independent security system for the continent. Even if the contours of that new system still seemed very hazy, the reality of the political will behind it was undeniable. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the NATO Alliance as a whole and specifically the American government had to recognize the presence and the legitimacy of a new force on the European security scene¹⁶. Thus, the stage is set for the current debate and the most important item on the agenda is to define what had been, up to that moment, a woolly and ambiguous wish.

II. IN SEARCH OF SUBSTANCE: THE COMPETING MODELS OF A
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY

1). Two blueprints for the same idea: ESDI between NATO
and the European Community

39. At the close of 1989, Europe's security debate received a tremendous push with the fall of the Berlin wall. This event, in fact, announced the end of the Soviet hold on Eastern and Central Europe and the coming reunification of Germany. The reform of Europe's traditional security system was suddenly becoming an urgent necessity.

40. In April 1990, emboldened by Secretary of State Baker's statement that the twelve had the main responsibility for drawing up the new European order¹⁷, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand called upon the EC to start work without delay on the institutional and political aspects of European Union¹⁸. This initiative was discussed at the EC summit meeting the same month in Dublin and the European Council decided in June to convene to the end of the year an intergovernmental conference on political union. A subsequent letter sent by Messrs. Kohl and Mitterrand to the EEC chairman in December proposed that the authority of the European Union and the Community be expanded to include a real security policy which would lead eventually to a common European defence. This proposal in turn was endorsed by the European Council meeting in Rome in mid-December of 1990.

41. In less than a year, European defence and security policy had worked its way at the heart of the EC agenda on political union, and all parties involved were

busily preparing detailed position papers on the future of European security in a debate which was increasingly catching the public's attention.

42. However, the institutions and the political actors which make up the European Community form a complex system which does not promote speedy decision-making. Moreover, the issues involved in European security and defence are themselves complex and divisive. As can be expected, the debate which started in the intergovernmental conference in January 1991 was lengthy and difficult.

43. If the urge to act upon the ESDI issue was acutely felt among EC members, so was the urge to keep NATO alive among the Atlanticists. Indeed, the Alliance had to face a double challenge which may well have threatened its very existence. On the one hand, NATO had to prove that it could adapt to Europe's new security environment. In a nutshell, it had to demonstrate that it could fulfil new roles in a context where political stability, crisis management, nation building and economic development, were becoming more important than deterrence and defence. On the other hand, NATO had to accommodate a much more assertive European inner group which it had welcomed some years ago. In other words, the Alliance had to recognize:

- a. that European members of the Alliance would themselves have to carry more and more the burden of their own defence; and
- b. that the acceleration of Europe's political and economic union process was an undisputable fact of life.

44. The problem, of course, was that NATO's alliance of equals is also a hierarchy of political powers led by the strongest among them, and a key question in that regard was (and still is): to what extent can a balance be struck between the traditional American leadership and Europe's emerging will to control its own destinies in every aspect?

45. It is probably too early to ask if the Alliance can answer that question positively but it is clear that NATO did not wait for the EC to take a stand on the ESDI issue. Since the London Declaration in June 1990, the Alliance has thus repeatedly called upon the allies "to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members"¹⁹. Furthermore, it welcomed the "efforts of the EC to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognized the significance of the progress made by the countries of the EC towards the goal of a political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy"²⁰.

46. Taking a bird's-eye view of the issue, the current debate has thus evolved along two broad lines: the Eurocentrist line taken by the EC and the Atlanticist stance adopted by NATO. Each of them has developed its own model of what the European Security and Defence Identity should look like in practice and it is to those that we will turn now.

2). ESDI as seen from a Euro-centrist perspective

47. In order to understand the nature and significance of the Europeanist concept of ESDI, a few words should be said about the institutional context of the

EC. Currently, the Communities comprise three main elements relevant to the present discussion: the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament. Briefly stated, the Commission is the supranational element of the Community; it oversees the permanent Community bureaucracy and is thereby responsible for the daily functioning of the EC as a whole. It is also the central operating institution in the EC and as a result it has significant decision making power. The Council, which is the political master of the Commission, is the ultimate decision-making authority in the EC; it is an intergovernmental body which convenes regularly at ministerial levels or with the heads of state; decisions by the Council are passed more and more by majority voting. The European Parliament which has been elected since 1979, does not possess much power compared to any national legislative assembly, but its prerogatives have been progressively extended and it can now - with certain limitations - veto or change proposed European legislation²¹. In general, the EC institutional system, although in embryonic form, embodies the basic elements of a federal organization. This, in fact, is the core of the present problem. Indeed, in order to enlarge its domain outside the scope of the Rome Treaty, the Community would have to absorb the EPC into its current framework. In this way, foreign and security policy, and maybe other areas, could be submitted to the same decision-making mechanisms as economic issues.

48. This is precisely what Europeanists, like Mr. Delors, would like to achieve²². In this way, for example, the Commission would gain a direct say in the making of Europe's foreign and security policy.

49. But, of course, several EC members do not agree with Mr. Delors' views, and that is why the Community will not have an easy choice in this matter. Britain, for example, does not agree with the Commission's president who believes that the Union would be best served by a single institutional framework and London was particularly annoyed at the idea that the Commission and the Parliament would have a say in the new European domains, such as foreign and security policy. Britain, along with France, Denmark and Ireland, want a two (or three)-speed European Union, and foreign and security policy is certainly not to be put on the fast track. In short, several visions of a European Defence Identity are presently clashing at the IGC on political union. For some Europeanists, a new ESDI, under the guise of the WEU, should be embedded in the Community at the Council level. Decisions would be made on the basis of proposals made by the Commission and they would be accepted or rejected by the WEU Council after having been scrutinized by the European Parliament. For other countries, like France, the locus of an ESDI should be the European Council; in other words, security and defence issues would remain intergovernmental matters decided upon by states. The WEU, in that perspective, although closely linked to the EPC, would remain outside the scope of the Commission's influence. Lastly, for other countries like Britain, the WEU, as the symbol of a distinct European Defence Identity, should not be integrated in the Community structure at all but could find a home in the Alliance.

50. In addition to these differing views, the role of the WEU as the central element of a European Defence Identity also presents a major intra-European problem of its own, and to quote a very perceptive analysis:

The memberships of the WEU, NATO and the EC do not coincide. Turkey, Iceland, and Norway are only members of NATO. Denmark and Greece are members of the EC and NATO, but not of the WEU. Finally, Ireland belongs to the EC but not the WEU and NATO. The membership issue presents a serious problem in the case of some countries. For example, Turkey resents being left out of the WEU and thus being made to suffer a relative downgrading in NATO. Allowing Greece to join the WEU makes some members nervous because they would be obliged to come to that country's assistance if it were to get involved in a conflict with Turkey²³.

51. Finally, it should be noted that the Eurocentrists have not decided upon the areas where a future European security and defence policy should apply. What would be the scope of a European foreign and security policy? What topics should it include and exclude? What type of defence issues should it cover, if any? Tired by the structural debate, which tends to get lost in the alphabet soup of Euro-acronyms, some Eurocentrists have tried to give the discussion a functional twist. Accordingly, whatever the potential organizational basis for ESDI, Europeans should have at least some specific competences in the area of security and defence. In that regard, the following six topics can be found in the first proposed draft treaty for a European union:

- a. industrial and technological co-operation in the armaments field;

- b. the transfer of military technology to third countries and the control of arms exports;
- c. non-proliferation issues;
- d. arms control, negotiations on arms reduction and confidence-building measures, particularly in the CSCE context;
- e. involvement in peacekeeping operations in the United Nations context;
- f. involvement in humanitarian intervention measures²⁴.

As can be seen, this list in itself could become the object of many controversies adding further to the complexities of the ESDI debate.

3). ESDI as seen from an Atlanticist perspective

52. If the preceding discussion looks like a Gordian knot, NATO's thinking on the same issue is refreshingly clear. The advantage of the Alliance resides of course in the fact that it does not have to reinvent the wheel. Moreover, NATO is a specialized organization which does not have to get involved in the numerous problems raised by Europe's economic and political union. The three facts underlying the Atlanticists' current position on the ESDI issue might be summarized in the following way:

- a. NATO was and still is the only viable European defence organization on the continent, and even in the absence of a massive Soviet threat it still has an essential role to play if only as a kind of insurance policy in a more peaceful but also more uncertain environment;
- b. the NATO Alliance is also the essential forum for consultation among its sixteen members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on their security and defence. As such, more than a consultative platform, NATO is an irreplaceable decision-making body providing impetus and leadership to European security policy as a whole;
- c. third, only NATO guarantees that North America's security remains tied to that of Europe, thus extending the Alliance's security zone from Berlin to Vancouver and adding the might of a superpower to Europe's already significant political and military capability.

53. Accordingly, if Atlanticists welcome a more assertive European Defence Identity, they also perceive as essential that those three basic qualities should be protected. In other words, whatever form ESDI will eventually take, it should not:

- a. duplicate NATO's military organization;
- b. become a competing forum where an inner group of European states would consult and pre-cook their security and defence policy among themselves;

- c. reduce the North-American members of the Alliance to the status of mercenaries hired for their guns but kept outside the magic circle where policy is made.

On this basis, claim the Atlanticists, everything is possible.

54. The European Political Co-operation (EPC), for example, could pursue its efforts to promote unity among its members in certain key areas of European foreign and security policy. This has been done (albeit with varying degrees of success) in the past and the recent examples of the Gulf war and the Yugoslavian crisis in 1990 and 1991 prove that there is room for European initiatives and actions in that regard²⁵. As for the Western European Union, it has been acknowledged by many - including the British - as a legitimate "bridge" between the Alliance and the EC institutions. What is meant exactly by that metaphor is not yet entirely clear, but it seems that the WEU could become a sort of European caucus within the framework of NATO. This does not mean, however, that the WEU would decide upon a policy course and present the NAC with a "fait accompli", but it could well be a consultative forum - which it is anyway. Moreover, some Atlanticists observe that the WEU could specialize in certain areas. It could take over, for example, the tasks of the IEPG and the Eurogroup. In that respect, it could fulfil a very useful role in coordinating the EC's and the Alliance's activities in the defence industrial sector. Besides, the WEU could become the proper political vehicle for the Alliance's out-of-area operations. Some suggest, in this perspective, that certain NATO commands could be "double-hatted" as NATO

or WEU forces depending on their mission. Alternatively, WEU member countries could be asked to designate certain units as elements of a potential European Rapid Reaction Force.

55. Finally, it should be stressed that the Atlanticists have in general been more sensitive to the Pan-European dimension of the continent's security environment. In this regard, many Alliance members have understood that a European Defence Identity would make sense only if it took into account the security vacuum created by the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

56. In other words, in view of the strategic significance of Central and Eastern Europe and its potential for economic and political instability, relations with that region have to become a priority for European security policy. As NATO neither could nor would extend any security guarantees to those countries, the proper framework for a security dialogue with Eastern and Central Europe could only be within the CSCE. In that respect, it is revealing that many proposals designed to strengthen the CSCE framework originated in the Alliance and not in the EC.

57. In general, this overview of the two competing approaches to ESDI shows convincingly that:

- a. the Eurocentric model of ESDI is far from mature and too controversial for many Europeans themselves;

- b. the Alliance centred approach, because it is more realistic and balanced, opens naturally the way to an elegant compromise.

58. The key questions then become: are the political players ready to settle the issue, and what outcome can we expect from the current phase of the debate?

III. WHERE DO THEY STAND? THE ALLIES AND THE ESDI ISSUE

59. In the current state of the ESDI debate, there is very little likelihood that the still emerging Eurocentrist model of European defence will gather enough support to challenge a reformed Atlanticist model, and a quick examination of NATO members' positions on the issue confirms this impression.

1). France: always the odd man out

60. Since the early sixties, France has attempted on numerous occasions to promote alternative defence structures for Europe, and Mr. Mitterrand remains faithful to this Gaullist tradition. However, the current offensive led by Paris suffers from numerous weaknesses which undermine its credibility.

61. Particularly, the French plan for a new European Defence Community or Identity is unclear on many points and the confusing statements issued by French officials seem to agree more on what should not be done rather than on what should be done. Specifically, French statements on ESDI often have an anti-American and anti-NATO undertone which many Europeans dislike; moreover, the French are rightly suspected by the other allies of being more concerned with the pursuit of their own interests than in the promotion of a more united Europe. Selfishness is of course a rather

common trait of any state's foreign policy objectives but France has made a bad habit of cloaking its real agenda with a high minded and self-righteous rhetoric much to the annoyance of its allies and neighbours.

62. In addition, even if France succeeds in presenting itself as the champion of European unity, it has not convincingly demonstrated that the Alliance constitutes an obstacle in that regard. Indeed, as Flora Lewis has noted, even veteran French policy-makers are at a loss to explain President Mitterrand's purpose in arguing to dissociate European defence from NATO planning and his vague ideas for a European confederation without the United States²⁶. At best, the President's tactics have been improper, and if the French intentions in distancing themselves from NATO's strategy review were to marginalize the Americans, France has failed. Indeed, up to now France has succeeded only in marginalizing itself, and it is revealing that it felt the need to rejoin the Alliance's review process in March 1991.

63. Yet, whatever its weaknesses and ambiguities, France's stand on the ESDI issue is also a long-term policy which sees the American pull-out of Europe as inevitable. Should this happen European defences would have to be

completely reorganized and France - because of its independent deterrent - would stand a good chance of gaining a leading role on the European security scene. Even if the US remains in Europe, French policy-makers know from experience that France's peculiar position in the Alliance is not without advantages. Accordingly, it seems that they are not yet ready to let their country abandon its traditional and insular stand.

2). France's wobbly supporters: Italy, Spain, Belgium and Germany

64. A puzzling fact which underlines the complexities of European politics is that France, although its position is quite controversial, has attracted considerable sympathy from Alliance members who also support NATO's review process. Chief among them, of course, is Germany whose staunch support of French ESDI's initiatives has been often misinterpreted by other Alliance members. The basic principles underlying Germany's position on the European defence issue however are straightforward.

65. First and foremost, German political elites, in general, are convinced that Europe as a Community is the only framework in which German ambitions can be realized. Accordingly, they support wholeheartedly the current efforts to strengthen and expand the role of European institutions and open the way to Europe's political union. In fact, according to many observers, Mr. Kohl is openly aiming for a United States of Europe (some might say he

really means a Federal Republic of Europe) and is pushing for policies that move in that direction²⁷.

66. In order to achieve that goal, however, Germany needs support from key European players and it is obvious that Britain - because of its deep seated allergy to the F-word (federalism) - will not be of any help. Thus, from Berlin's perspective, French-German cooperation is the best way to move things forward in the EC. Of course, the price to be paid is German support for French pet initiatives which promote their vision of ESDI and this puts Germany in an awkward position.

67. Germany wants to be one of the main architects of a new Europe, but it also realizes that NATO as a defence organization, as a security forum and as the symbol of transatlantic solidarity is irreplaceable for a long time to come. Hence, Bonn has also been one of the driving forces pushing the NATO review process along. Luckily for German policy-makers, their position is less difficult than it first appeared to be, and they succeeded in striking a credible balance between the French inspired Eurocentrism on the ESDI issue and their support for NATO. In fact, one might even say that Bonn succeeded in giving an Atlanticist slant to some of the most noted Franco-German initiatives. In short, the German position has been summarized very convincingly by a diplomat who stated: "We refuse to choose between Atlantic security and European integration for we want both"²⁸.

68. Apart from Germany, France's ideas have also gained some ground on the periphery of the Alliance. Italy, Spain and Greece in the south, and Belgium and

Luxembourg in the north have stated their support for the inclusion of European Defence as one of the goals of political union. Furthermore, they all expressed the wish to see the WEU, which is the ESDI forum, absorbed by the EC. With the exception of Spain, however, all of these countries have also stated their preference for preserving the Atlantic link and the Alliance's integrity along the lines of NATO's current communiqués. It is thus doubtful that they would take a radical Euro-centrist stand if it came to a choice between NATO and the ESDI.

3). Britain and the Atlanticists

69. Great Britain is probably the most conservative ally regarding the issue of a Eurocentric Defence. Mr. Major, as Mrs. Thatcher before him, does not share the enthusiasm of other European countries for Europe's Political and Economic Union. Accordingly, Her Majesty's Government has taken the view that the strong wine of Eurocentric euphoria should be diluted by a large admixture of realism. In that regard, Great Britain has taken the lead of those who think that even in the context of a progressively more integrated Europe, federalism is still a pipedream and the best way to defend Europe is still NATO. In spite of this very conservative stand, Britain has taken a surprisingly pragmatic and flexible approach to the ESDI issue. Indeed, it is British who have made the greatest efforts to define the parameters of a viable European pillar compatible with NATO's continued existence. Specifically, the British readily accepted that the WEU could be the key element of the ESDI and they also attempted to define the areas in which the Union could fulfil the most useful role. It is thus quite misleading

to picture Britain as the villain in the great European celebration.

70. Moreover, in taking a clear Atlanticist stand the British have offered a rallying point to the small European powers who feel they have the most to lose from the sudden wave of Euromania. Particularly, countries like Holland, Norway and Denmark understand that if the European Council takes over the role of the North Atlantic Council in whole or in part, they could lose the measure of influence they now have in the framework of the Alliance. Furthermore, taking into account the present lack of influence of the European Parliament over the EPC, the proposed Eurocentric defence structure would further increase - they claim - the "democratic deficit" which characterizes the Community policy-making process.

4). The United States: signals or noises?

72. With the end of the rigid bipolar structure of the European cold war and the emergence of a still unspecified new continental security architecture, it was only logical for Washington policy-makers to undertake an in depth review of the US commitments to Europe. The main elements of this review are easy to reconstruct on the basis of common sense.

73. To start with, the political mutations of the Soviet Union are still in doubt and the risks of an implosion in the Russian empire are higher than ever. Moreover, the Soviet armed forces retain a significant military power which has to be minimally deterred. In short, there is still a place for an American presence in

Europe and as we have seen, most Europeans agree on that point. In addition, there are plenty of arguments to preserve a strong relationship between the United States and the European Community if only to serve as an open channel for the management of trade and economic issues. On the other hand, it is clear that certain assumptions of America's European policies have to be modified. First of all, in view of the inevitable reductions in American forces stationed in Europe, Washington's influence on many European key political players will naturally diminish. Furthermore, Europe's impending political and economic union is heralding the emergence of a new more assertive Community whose interests will not necessarily always coincide with American policies. Finally, Washington has to take into account possible shifts in the American domestic political scene. Particularly, the attitude of Congress and the mood of the American public could evolve rapidly especially in a context of drastic fiscal restraints. Moreover, in the wake of the Gulf war many Americans are beginning to question the US role of global policeman and peacekeeper in view of the high costs and meager results of such undertakings.

74. Washington's apparent decision to preserve NATO, to maintain its commitment to Europe and to acknowledge the emergence of a European Defence Identity is thus very reassuring for those - on both sides of the Atlantic - who still believe in the vital importance of the Atlantic Alliance as a safety net and as the collective builder of Europe's future security architecture.

75. But for some observers, Europeans should not take American foreign policy for granted. Specifically,

behind the accommodating rhetoric of NATO's communiqués the tone of US diplomacy has hardened lately, and what many perceive as isolated losses of temper could in fact be signals of a genuine change in the direction of US European policy.

76. Accordingly, the final point to be made here is that a superficial analysis of the ESDI debate could all too easily bring an observer to the conclusion that the game is up and that the Atlanticists have won. This may in all likelihood be true in the short run - barring any unexpected miscalculation - but a successful NATO summit in the fall of 1991 does not mean that the ESDI issue is settled and that the U.S. could not drift away from Europe.

CONCLUSION

77. In lieu of a conclusion, let's examine some of the implications the ESDI debate has for Canada.

78. As a starting point, one fact regarding Canada's security and defence policy should stand out. Although Canada's involvement in the European security system has been an established tradition through the post-1945 period, it has remained indisputably limited.

79. In consequence, the degree of Canada's influence over European security and defence policies has remained an object of debate. Basically, two schools of thought have emerged from that discussion. On the one hand, Canadian Atlanticists argue that Canada is after all - in theory if not in practice - an equal partner in the European security system and that Canada's status as an Atlantic power

demands that we take an active part in every aspect of Europe's security debate. On the other hand, a growing number of Canadians, frustrated by the complexities of European politics and by what they perceive as the lack of Canadian influence in Europe, advocate a more complacent attitude of laissez-faire: after all, Canada has so little power...

80. Accordingly, in the context of the present dispute over ESDI, the stand Canada takes will hinge upon these two approaches.

81. Two key questions should be asked in that regard:

- a. are Canadian security interests still as strongly linked to those of Europe as in the past?
- b. and, discounting the question of Canada's political influence, is there still a role for Canada to play in the framework of Europe's new political architecture?

Taking an optimistic standpoint, the two questions might be answered positively.

82. First, Canada's involvement in European security did not stem primarily from the East-West confrontation. It was and is dictated by the indivisible character of world security of which Europe is a central element.

83. Second, Canada's interests in Europe's security were not always military and the current situation offers

more and not less opportunities for Canadian diplomatic efforts.

84. If those two premises are accepted, several points can be made. First, Canada is right to take a strong stand in order to preserve the Alliance - not as a purely military organization - but as the symbol of Atlantic solidarity and as an essential security forum.

85. Second, it can be argued that Canada should take advantage of its status as a North-American country less directly involved in the ESDI issue, in order to facilitate a constructive outcome for the current debate. To do this, direct channels to the WEU and the main EC institutions should be used to gain a better grasp of the discussion and a clearer understanding of the major players' positions.

86. Third, it could be pointed out that pan-European security institutions like the CSCE, and other international organizations like the G7, in which Canada participates, will constitute essential elements of a new European order. With that in mind any viable concept of an ESDI will have to take into account the interrelationships which link European and non-European actors in the same security framework.

87. Fourth, looking at Eastern and Central Europe, the tragic situation in which many former Soviet allies find themselves offers many opportunities for Canada, including in the area of security and arms control.

88. Finally, as an experienced peacekeeper, Canada has much to offer Europe in light of its current political and ethnic instabilities.

89. In general, the present wave of Eurocentricism symbolized by the ESDI debate should not hide the fact that Canada is and could continue to be deeply involved in Europe's security affairs. Indeed, the present situation offers more opportunity to expand Canada's influence than ever and it is a matter of political will if these opportunities are exploited or not.

Notes

1. See Alan Tonelson, "What is the National Interest?", The Atlantic, vol. 268, n. 1, July 1991.
2. See Henri Pac, Defense et sécurité européenne, Eyrolles, Paris, 1991, p.37.
3. Alfred Cahen, Western Defence: the European Role in NATO, NATO, Brussels, 1988, p.4.
4. See Annex.
5. "Because nowadays it is common to pay more attention to the people fighting for a cause than to the cause itself one runs the risk of giving credence to dreams whose only credibility lies in the passion of those supporting them" Henri Pac, op. cit., p.3.
6. Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West-European Security Cooperation", Adelphi Paper 244, Autumn 1989, p.21-28.
7. Alfred Cahen, the West European Union and NATO, Brassey's, London, p.6.
8. the Strategic Defence Initiative (1983) and the Reykjavik summit (1986) were key moments in that regard.
9. See Annex.
10. See Ian Gambles, op. cit., p.40-41.
11. Spain and Portugal joined the WEU in 1988.
12. Alfred Cahen, op. cit., p.50.
13. Ian Gambles, op. cit., p.40-41.
14. R. Rupp, "Progress Towards a More Unite Europe likely impact on Defence Industrial Development", Paper presented at the NATO Economics Workshop, 15-17 May 1991, p.5-7.
15. See Annex.
16. See Annex.

17. See Annex.
18. Ibidem.
19. Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Copenhagen, 6th-7th June 1991, Press Communiqué, p.2.
20. Ibidem.
21. This description is taken from David Mutimer, "Institutional Change and the New European Politics", n. 12, March 1990, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, p.2-4.
22. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security", Survival, vol. 33, n. 2, March/April 1991, p.99-110.
23. Jon Willem Hanig, NATO An Institution under threat, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1991, p.60.
24. Europe/Documents n. 1709/1710, 3 May 1991, p.18.
25. Holly Porteous, "Seeking a Stronger Identity," Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 16 n[4, 27 July 1991, p.158-159.
26. Flora Lewis, "Europe: Collective Security is Taking Shape", Herald Tribune, 21 June 1991.
27. "A German Idea of Europe", The Economist, 27 July 1991, p.50.
28. "In the beginning was the word, and the word was defence", The Economist. 18 May 1991, p.59.

A N N E X

by

Ghislaine Machabée

Annex I: A Chronology of the European Defence Identity

- 1948** Signing of the Brussels Treaty by France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries.
- 1954** Failure of the Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community. The Federal Republic and Italy join the Brussels treaty which will become the framework of the Western European Union.
- 1955** Creation of the Western European Union by France, Great Britain, the Benelux countries, FRG and Italy.
- 1962** Rejection of the Fouchet Plans, which envisaged a joint defence policy in the context of a European political union.
- 4 July** In a speech delivered at Philadelphia, President Kennedy calls upon Western Europe to assume the role of "a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations". The dominant metaphor has come to be that of the need to construct a "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance.
- 1963** Signing of the Elysée Treaty by President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. De Gaulle seeks to construct a European consensus independent from the superpowers, but in ratifying the Treaty, the Bundestag appends a preamble which confirms the priority of the Federal Republic's American connection. For nearly 20 years, the Treaty will fail to harmonize Franco-German defence co-operation.
- 1970** Creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) as an instrument to coordinate some aspects of foreign policy. From the start, Political Co-operation was taken to include security elements.

1973

April The European Parliament (EP) adopts a resolution on political co-operation and the political unification of Europe. The core of this resolution lies in the statement: "in practice, co-operation in the field of foreign policy can hardly ever be separated from defence and security policy".

1975

Dec. Report on European Union by the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, for the European Council. The report observes that security policy must fall within the purview of the European Union. Consequently, it urges the Community member states to conduct a regular exchange of views about West Europe's specific security problems. On the basis of this report, Parliament adopts a resolution clearly expressing the intention to strengthen co-operation in the field of security and to include security policy in the responsibilities of a future European union.

1978

June The European Parliament (EP) adopts a resolution on European armaments procurement co-operation. This resolution calls upon the Commission to submit a European action program for the development and production of conventional armaments within the framework of the common industrial policy of the EC. The adoption of this resolution was regarded as another important step in promoting co-operation between Community member states in the sphere of security policy.

1981

July EP resolution of "European political co-operation and the role of the European Parliament". This resolution emphasizes the necessity to include the subject of European security in matters covered by European political cooperation. This had been mentioned by the Foreign Ministers in May of this year. In addition, the resolution

calls for co-operation on security policy to be continued and extended.

October London Report on European Political Co-operation, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the ten member states. The report clearly states that the flexible and pragmatic procedure which had previously made it possible to consider the political aspects of security within the framework of EPC should be retained in the future.

1982

Feb. Implementation of the long suspended defence component of the Elysée Treaty. This marks the starting point of a series of bilateral efforts to achieve closer co-operation in Western European security policy. François Mitterrand has stated at the time that "the only embryo of common European defence resides in the Franco-German Elysée Treaty".

Oct. Establishment of a Franco-German Commission on Security and Defence, with working groups on arms co-operation, military co-operation and political-strategic affairs.

1983

Jan. EP resolution on the link between European security and European Political Co-operation. This resolution, which is central to the subsequent development of security cooperation, calls upon the Community member states, on the basis of an analysis of their common security concerns, to give substance to a true concept of European peace and security, founded on the principles of Détente, arms control and peaceful coexistence between all states and all peoples.

June Signing of the Solemn Declaration on the European Union.
The Genscher-Colombo Initiative, on which this Declaration is based, expresses the wish to take steps, within the framework of EPC, to coordinate the positions of the member states on the political and economic aspects of security.

1984

11 April EP resolution on the "common European interests and requirements in the area of security". Based on the Klepsch Report this resolution instructs the Political Affairs Committee "to establish a permanent subcommittee on political and economic aspects of security".

Sept. With the organization of the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament, the EP starts to treat security policy as a genuine part of its field of activity.

In the second half of the 1980s, the EP attracts attention with an impressive number of its own reports, questions and resolutions relating to security policy.

27 Oct. The Western European Union's (WEU) Rome Declaration marks the reactivation of this organisation. It puts a resolutely Atlanticist cast on its new programme, whose most important element is the commitment to reactivate the Western European Union Council at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

1985

March Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs ("Dooce Committee"), set up by the European Council in June 1984. This report calls for a full discussion of security and defence matters among EC members, including defence industrial issues hitherto formally excluded from EC and EPC debate.

Dec. Public hearings on the prospects of European security policy (organised by the EP's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament). The main point which emerges is that the European Parliament must continue to press for a common European security policy.

End of the year Signing of the Single European Act (SEA) by the Twelve member states of the EC. Security cooperation within the EPC is formally codified in the SEA.

1987

- March Mr. Delors, the new president of the EC's Commission, proposes to convene a meeting of the EC whose purpose would be to adopt a European position on the current disarmament negotiations and to "lay the foundations for a European security policy". This initiative meets the opposition of three EC's member states which do not belong to the WEU.
- July The Single European Act comes into effect. The 12 member states of the EC are now formally committed to giving their attention to cooperation in the sphere of security policy.
- 12 July Mr Delors recalls journalists in The Hague that, in the view of the founding fathers of Europe, the purpose of European integration was to ensure peace, but that peace carried with it the idea of defence. He adds that 12 July Europeans "should equip themselves with defence institutions" whose steering body would be the meeting of heads of government.
- Sept. Mr. Delors delivers a speech in which he states: "(...) my hope lies in the WEU which can play a useful role as an interface between the European Community, and the Atlantic Alliance".
- 27 Oct. WEU's adoption of a Platform on European Security Interests. Aired as the basic text of West European security co-operation.
- End of the year The output of Franco-German security co-operation reaches its zenith. 1987 sees three high-profile bilateral initiatives:
- the agreement to establish a mixed Franco-german brigade;
 - the proposal to form a Franco-German Defence and Security Council (proposal ratified by large majorities in the Assemblée Nationale and the Bundestag in Dec. 1988);
 - the holding of a major bilateral field exercise (called Moineau hardi/Kecker Spatz), which takes place in Bavaria in Sept. 1987.
- 28 Oct. At the US Military Academy at West Point, President Reagan observes that "(...) we have

seen the emergence among some of our European allies of a willingness, even an eagerness, to seek a larger more closely coordinated role for Western Europe in providing its own defence. We Americans welcome this".

1988

- Jan. The European Parliament asserts in a resolution that the political, economic and military aspects of security are interrelated, thus placing a broad interpretation on the provisions of the Single European Act with regard to security policy cooperation. It states that, after the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the European Community will have a greater responsibility to develop its own identity in security policy within the Western Alliance. The resolution calls for the CSCE process to be used as an instrument of a comprehensive European security policy.
- 22 March French Minister of Defence, André Giraud, declares in a speech that "European defence is not imaginable outside the Atlantic Alliance".
- May A special report of the North Atlantic Assembly entitled "NATO in the 1990s" suggests that European members of the Alliance prepare a yearly threat assessment. It also proposes to initiate a study regarding the establishment of a European Pillar in the framework of the Alliance.
- 11 Oct. President Mitterrand in a major defence policy speech states: "In 1992-1993, all our familiar assumptions will change. Among them, our assumptions about the common defence of Europe. Then it will be understood that Europe will not exist unless it can take responsibility itself for its own defence".
- 14 Nov. Signing by the Nine countries of the Protocol of Accession of Portugal and Spain to the WEU.

1989

- Jan. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr. Francisco Fernandez-Ordóñez, uses the occasion of the Spanish accession to the EC Presidency to call for the amendment of the limiting words of the SEA regarding security.

- 6 Feb. Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, French Minister of Defence states: "Without doubt, a European system of defence will crown the process of European construction".
- Summer The Norwegian Minister of Defence belittles the WEU as a "sideshow" compared to NATO.
- 12 Dec. In a speech delivered in Berlin U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, outlines the "Baker doctrine". Mr. Baker says - and solemnly recognizes - that the Twelve have the main responsibility for drawing up the new European order.

1990

- 29 March In a French television address, Chancellor Kohl calls for the creation of the United States of Europe by the year 2000.
- 19 April A French-German joint initiative calls on the Twelve to start work without delay on the institutional and political aspects of European Union.
- 23 April Signing of the first formal communiqué since 1987 by the WEU's Foreign and Defence ministers.
- 28 April The EC summit in Dublin agrees that NATO would be "maintained" as the main security framework for its members.
- 25-26 June The European Council meeting in Dublin announces its decision to hold an intergovernmental conference on political union.
- July London Declaration: at their summit in London, NATO's heads of state and government announce a fundamental review of the Alliance's political and military strategy.
- 20 Sept. The Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis expresses the opinion that as a result of the Gulf crisis, the time is ripe for an EC takeover of the WEU.
- Autumn A confidential paper (i.e. Italian EC Presidency report) sent to EC governments indicates a growing consensus to give the European Parliament the final word on many EC laws and to give the Community a clear defence role for the first

time. The report suggests that the EC - rather than the WEU - should lead and co-ordinate military initiatives. The paper says that the EC should take over the defence role of the WEU when the Brussels Treaty expires in 1998.

20 Nov. Signing of the Transatlantic Declaration by the United States. "This Declaration lays the foundations for a revived partnership based on increased transatlantic solidarity and acknowledges the existence of a European identity in the field of security policy, pointing the way to an equitable sharing of responsibilities and burdens".

4 Dec. In a recommendation to the Council of Ministers, the WEU assembly comes out against the recent proposal by Italy that the WEU be associated with the EC. The assembly likewise rejects a proposal of the European Parliament aimed at stopping the further reactivation of the WEU in order to open the way to its integration in the EC. The assembly finds that the implementation of these proposals would lead to a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance.

6 Dec. Joint letter sent by Mr. Mitterrand and Mr. Kohl to the EC chairman. The letter proposes that the authority of the Union and the Community be expanded. "In addition, political union should include a real security policy which would eventually lead to a common defence". The letter proposes that the WEU ultimately becomes a part of the political union.

14-15 Dec. Meeting in Rome of the European Council. All EC members see the WEU as the main defence bridge-building organization between the Community and NATO. But France, Germany and Italy look on it essentially as a transitional stage on the road to a genuine European security and defence policy, while Britain regards it basically as an extension of NATO.

17-18 Dec. In a communiqué, NATO Foreign Ministers describe the future role of the Alliance in the security of Europe. The adaptation of the Alliance will include enhancing the role of the European Allies. The three key elements of the European

architecture are the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE.

- 27 Dec. The Spanish Government deems it "feasible and necessary" to devise a European security and defence policy, and to this end backs a rapprochement between the WEU and the EC.

1991

- 4 Feb. A common French-German proposal on European security policy is introduced at the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union.

- 22 Feb. WEU extraordinary meeting in Paris regarding the future place of that organisation in the new European security architecture.

- 26 March A majority of European Community countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg) agree on the need for a common defence policy, but run into strong opposition from Britain and the Netherlands. They disagree on whether the WEU should be gradually brought under the control of the EC. At an EC Foreign Ministers meeting in special session in Luxembourg, U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd tells his colleagues that a European Defence Identity has to remain compatible with the Alliance.

- 11 April President François Mitterrand's states: "For the present and for many years to come, Western Europe's defence can only be envisaged in the context of the Atlantic Alliance (...). Our aim is not to create a defence organization which would replace NATO. It is simply to recognize the limits of the Atlantic Alliance and its military organization".

28-29

- May The new NATO force structure is unveiled in Brussels.

6-7

- June Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen. Final communiqué: "The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. (...) We further agree that

(...) we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance".

17 June Foreign Ministers' meeting in Luxembourg: Britain rejects as fundamentally unacceptable a European Community treaty proposal for a "federal" union with a single currency and a future military role. It was the first explicit reference in an EC document to the word "federal".

20 June Meeting in Berlin of the 35 Foreign Ministers of the CSCE: a new emergency mechanism for dealing with crises in Europe is agreed upon.

28-29

June Luxembourg summit of the EC.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM
(highest classification of Title, Abstract, Keywords)

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (the name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Establishment sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Department of National Defence		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (overall security classification of the document, including special warning terms if applicable) Unclassified
3. TITLE (the complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S,C or U) in parentheses after the title.) In Search for an Identity: Europe, NATO and the ESDI Debate		
4. AUTHORS (Last name, first name, middle initial) FORTMANN, Michel P.		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (month and year of publication of document) November 1991	6a. NO. OF PAGES (total containing information. Include Annexes, Appendices, etc.) 45	6b. NO. OF REFS (total cited in document) 28
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (the category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) ORAE Extra Mural Paper No. 58		
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (the name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include the address.) Directorate of Strategic Analysis		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant)	9b. CONTRACT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written) 3565-44146 (D Strat A)	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (the official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) EMP 58	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NOS. (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor) -	
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification) <div style="margin-left: 20px;"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unlimted distribution <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments and defence contractors; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments and Canadian defence contractors; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to government departments and agencies; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution limited to defence departments; further distribution only as approved <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify):</div>		
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in 11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.) unlimited distribution		

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM

13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual).

This paper seeks to provide an introduction to the current debate over the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). It begins by presenting a brief critical analysis of earlier European attempts to assert a distinct identity on defence and security issues, which will set the historical context for the current debate. The second chapter attempts to lend greater definition to the concept of ESDI by reviewing the different models put forth by various participants in the debate. This is followed by a discussion of the current debate, with an accounting of the positions held by major Alliance partners. The paper also assesses the implications of this debate for the Alliance and for Canadian security policy.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

- European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)
- New European Security Architecture
- European Security
- Atlantic Alliance
- Intra European Relations
- Canadian- European Relations

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM

